

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2A

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600430045-9
USA TODAY
19 MAY 1983

NEWSMAKERS

BEHIND THE SCENES WITH PEOPLE IN THE HEADLINES

Part of book by ex-director spooking CIA

Former CIA director Stansfield Turner hasn't finished writing his memoirs, but speculation is already rife about what national secrets he wants to disclose.

Turner is trying to play by CIA rules in writing his memoirs on what it's like to be the U.S.'s chief spy. But he's running into the very same pre-publication problems he gave others when he ran the agency.

CIA censors are scrutinizing Turner's half-finished book. The agency admitted Wednesday it has objected to three of the seven chapters Turner has submitted, saying they include classified information that might harm CIA sources.

CIA employees have to sign an "official secrecy agreement" before they're hired, saying they will submit any future writings to the agency for pre-publication approval.

Turner, 59, a former Navy

admiral, headed the CIA during the Carter administration from 1977 to 1981.

Although the CIA won't comment specifically, controversial affairs of state that Turner is expected to cover in reviewing his career include:


■ The Soviet Afghanistan invasion in December 1979, and whether the Western intelligence community predicted it.

■ Whether the Soviets were suspected of being behind the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran.

■ The reason behind the U.S. decision to provide cancer treatment facilities to the Shah of Iran, which purportedly touched off the Iranian action.

Turner has no publisher yet, and his lawyers won't even give the working title of his book because they want as little confrontation with censors as possible.

But Turner objects to some



AP

TURNER: Says he may go to court over proposed cuts.

of the CIA cuts, and says he may go to court.

Former President Jimmy Carter wrote in his book that he was "deeply troubled by embarrassing activities of our government, such as the CIA's role in plotting murder and other crimes."

Turner, upon being named director in 1977, planned to counter that reputation and improve the CIA's faltering public image by opening up agency headquarters for public tours, increasing the public affairs staff and making high agency officials available for press briefings. He also wanted to relax the clandestine regulations surrounding CIA activities.

One of William Casey's first moves when he took over for the Reagan administration was to scrap the plan and reduce the public affairs staff by almost half.

As CIA director, Turner approved the prosecution of former CIA officer Frank Snepp III, who refused to clear his book about the fall of Saigon.

The Supreme Court eventually forced Snepp to give the agency \$140,000 from sales of his book, *Decent Interval*.

Turner, a former Rhodes Scholar who lives in McLean, Va., has two children.

18 May 1983

Lucian Watchful eyes on CIA's covert activities

WASHINGTON—One of our favorite bureaucratic types is Stansfield Turner, the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency who was roundly criticized when he abolished 820 CIA positions.

Asked at a breakfast session with reporters whether he would do it again, he replied: "Absolutely, but I'd do it differently."

As Turner states his case, the CIA was not doing too well when he took over under the Carter Administration. There was no upward mobility among the younger people on the staff, and the oldsters thought they could get away with almost anything despite growing sentiment in Congress to impose strict "oversight" over clandestine activities.

So he abolished 820 jobs, but to hear him tell it, it wasn't all that drastic. He maintains he actually fired only 17 persons. A total of 202 persons were affected by the retrenchment, he says, but of these some 150 were asked to retire—taken care of by attrition over a 2 year period, and about 25 to 30 moved to other sections.

"But I did not do it well," he confessed. "The action was disclosed to those affected in a curt bureaucratic letter. I would have liked to have made amends for this with a follow-up two-page tactful letter, but those in the system talked me out of it."

The onetime Navy admiral has some advice for the Reagan Administration and the way the CIA operates today. No more, Turner says, can the CIA indulge in any "controversial" covert (that is, secret) activities.

The administration and the CIA should have known, he said, that any effort to overthrow the Nicaraguan

government was of such controversial import that it was bound to cause trouble.

Sure enough, when the CIA hired Argentines and supporters of the former Nicaraguan dictator, Somoza, to try to destabilize the Sardonista government of Nicaragua, an outcry arose.

"When the 1976 CIA reform law was passed requiring Congressional oversight of CIA activities, that was the end of any CIA activities of a controversial nature, or should have been," says Turner. "Nowadays, you have to have a consensus behind such activity."

As an example, Turner doubts

whether there would be any criticism of the CIA conducting covert actions in Afghanistan in support of the freedom fighters and the overthrow of the Soviet puppet government.

The admiral is deeply certain that under certain conditions covert CIA activities are perfectly proper and even moral.

He wouldn't mind at all if the Sandonistas were overthrown in Nicaragua, and he thinks Khaddafi in Libya would be a perfect and moral target for a CIA-supported overthrow, although he doubts whether in the present circumstances such action is practical or workable.

He declines to say whether he would have supported the CIA effort to destabilize the Allende Marxist government of Chile, but insists that, given the proper motivation, "there is nothing morally wrong in overthrowing a government by covert means."

However, he warns, the U.S. government must be sure before it engages in

any such activity that the government it seeks to overthrow would not be replaced by some government even more repressive and against the best interests of the United States and the country involved.

"Sometimes we might be giving the impression that we are trying to put dictators back in power, and that would be bad," he suggests.

So the Turner formula for overthrowing governments is to take a good hard look first at these questions:

Do we really think we can bring it off?

Will the prospective governmental replacement really be in the best interests of the United States and the country targeted?

Is the proposed covert activity likely to be too controversial to be accepted by the Congressional oversight activities?

If the answer to the first two questions is "yes," and the last "no," then the cloak-and-dagger boys have Turner's blessing to overthrow the Khaddafis, the Sandonistas, et al.

The admiral left little doubt that conditions are not presently ripe for trouble making with any foreign governments, except possibly Afghanistan, and even that doesn't seem very practical in the face of all those Soviet tanks.

LUCIAN WARREN is the *Frederick News-Post* Senior Washington correspondent.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A**

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600430045-9
NEW YORK TIMES
18 MAY 1983

Ex-Intelligence Director Disputes Censorship of His Book on C.I.A.

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 17 — Adm. Stansfield Turner, who as Director of Central Intelligence prosecuted Frank W. Snepp 3d, a former officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, for refusing to clear his book about the fall of Saigon, is disputing C.I.A. censors over his own book on intelligence.

Admiral Turner acknowledged in an interview that the agency's Publications Review Board had objected to portions of three chapters in his uncompleted book. As much as 10 percent of one section was deleted, on the ground that it included classified information that would be injurious to the protection of agency sources and methods.

The retired Navy admiral, who served as Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration, has vigorously disputed the agency's censorship in negotiations that began early this year.

Admiral Turner has retained an attorney, Anthony Lapham, who was the C.I.A.'s general counsel at the time of the Snepp proceedings, and said he was prepared to litigate if a satisfactory compromise could not be reached.

The former Director has no publisher yet for his book because it cannot be shown to outsiders until it is cleared by the agency. He said the book focused on the issues "of running secret intelligence operations in a democratic society."

Charles E. Wilson, chairman of the agency's Publications Review Board, confirmed today in a telephone interview that the board had "noted some things that are deemed classified" in Admiral Turner's book.

Mr. Wilson praised the former Director's previous cooperation with the board and expressed confidence that the current dispute would be resolved short of litigation. "If we did end up in court it would surprise me," he said. "This is a highly negotiated process."

Before posing a legal challenge to the agency's right to censor his book, Admiral Turner said, he had "a number of options."

"I can simply print anything and let them sue me," he went on. "The onus is on them to stop me from publishing." He added that could also "tell them that

I don't agree with their deletions and then they have to go to the Justice Department" to decide how to proceed.

Mr. Snepp, who was forced by a Supreme Court ruling in February 1980 to give the Government \$140,000 in earnings from his book, "Decent Interval," published by Random House in 1977, expressed little sympathy for Admiral Turner. "I think Turner deserves everything the censors visit on him because he failed to recognize just how dangerous censorship was in the first place," the former agent said in a telephone interview.

"I hate to think of anybody being censored," Mr. Snepp added, "but I think there is poetic justice in the fact that the architect of the C.I.A.'s censorship should now be feeling the heat."

In the interview, the former Director defended the intelligence agency's review program. "I've endorsed the process that I'm going through," he said. "I'm not fighting that."

Number of Modifications Made

His complaint, he added, was over what he termed the "mechanics" of the censorship process. "It's a bad system to take an internal set of rules and apply them to external people," he said, maintaining that rules designed to prevent the spread of information inside the agency should not apply to him because everything that he wrote would be cleared anyway.

At issue, Admiral Turner said, "are specific anecdotes of operations that I had experiences with" while serving as Director of Central Intelligence. "They feel that by describing the operations I

would violate security," he said.

The former Director said he made a number of modifications to his book to meet the agency's objection. But he added that in many other cases he was convinced the agency had no basis for asking for deletions.

The overall result of the agency's censorship, Admiral Turner said, was damaging to his work in progress, which is nearly completed. In one chapter, the C.I.A.'s proposed cuts "in effect mean there's not much message left." The general tenor of the cuts, he added, "changes the chapters and makes them less appealing from a sales point of view."

Admiral Turner, in the interview, was reluctant to question the motives of the C.I.A.'s censors, but one of his former senior aides at the agency, who has been involved in the preparation of the book, depicted the deletions as nit-picking and quibbling.

"Stan Turner understands as well as anyone what is classified and what is not," the aide said. "He feels there are fundamental issues in carrying out intelligence in a free society, but there are absolutely unclassified issues — political science issues; if you will."

The aide added that Admiral Turner had upset many agency employees by authorizing the dismissal of hundreds of senior operatives.

Senior intelligence officials acknowledged that there was a growing enmity between Admiral Turner and high-level officials in the Reagan Administration, including William J. Casey, the current Director.

Admiral Turner has emerged in the past year as a leading critic of the Administration's intelligence policies and strategic programs, and has made his criticisms in print.

STAT

2
Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600430045-9
WASHINGTON POST
17 MAY 1983
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8

Reagan Pushes MX As Arms-Cuts Device

Lobbying for the MX missile, President Reagan insisted yesterday that "I do want arms control," and dismissed suggestions that his commitment isn't sincere as "amateur psychoanalysis."

"I can't believe that this world can go on . . . with this kind of weapon on both sides, poised at each other, without some day some fool or some maniac or some accident triggering a war that is the end of the line for all of us," Reagan told a group of business executives at the White House.

Reagan said the United States must build up its strategic forces to put pressure on the Soviet Union to negotiate arms reductions and maintain peace.

The session with the business executives was the latest step in a drive by Reagan to win congressional approval of funds for the 10-warhead nuclear MX.

Meanwhile, in a counterattack, two former directors of

the CIA warned that deploying the MX would put a hair-trigger on nuclear war because both the United States and Soviet Union would be tempted to fire first for fear of losing their missiles to such a silo-busting weapon.

William E. Colby and Stansfield Turner, CIA directors in the Nixon and Carter administrations, respectively, sounded that warning in a news conference called by Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), one of six announced contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination, to launch what he called "a national mobilization to stop the MX missile."

Congress should "get rid of this particularly dangerous weapon and put to rest any prospect that we would go for a first-strike strategy," Colby said.

The Soviets, Turner said, would be "nervous" about the possibility of the United States launching the MX against Soviet targets.

"They will have to have their finger on the trigger," he said, to guard against losing their missiles to a first strike, while the United States will have to do the same thing for fear of losing the MX in a surprise blow.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3A

Approved for Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600430045-9
17 MAY 1983



Sen. Gary Hart, D-Colo. (left), with former CIA directors William Colby and Stansfield Turner (right) voices opposition at Capitol Hill press conference to administration's plans for MX missile development and deployment. Larry Lambert/Washington Times

Critics call for MX plan's rejection

By Thomas D. Brandt
and William Kling
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

Foreign policy, intelligence and defense experts from prior administrations joined congressional critics of the MX missile yesterday, urging rejection of President Reagan's development and deployment plans.

Sen. Gary Hart, D-Colo., announcing a "Stop the MX" campaign at a Capitol Hill press conference, said those who support the nuclear freeze or arms control should reject MX because it "represents a substantial escalation of the arms race."

William Colby, CIA director under President Nixon, said MX could only be used for a first-strike attack against the Soviets, or for "launch on warning" of an attack from them, strategies disavowed by the United States.

And former CIA director Stansfield Turner, who served under President Carter, said that deployment of the MX would destabilize superpower relations

because of its possible first-strike use, forcing the Soviets "to keep their finger on the trigger."

Rep. Les AuCoin, D-Ore., called for rejection of the "so-called bargain" that Reagan struck in letters to congressmen last week, trading congressional approval of funds for MX for the president's pledge to seek an arms-control agreement.

Speaking with Hart, Rep. Patricia Schroeder, D-Colo., asked how it is possible that administration spokesmen profess to be "most interested in peace when they are lusting after new weapons systems."

Reagan, speaking in the East Room of the White House to more than 200 corporate chief executive officers, said, "I know it sounds silly — to build a missile in order to get rid of a missile — but we're very dangerously close to not having the deterrent that we need to keep the other fellow from using his, or at least using them, for blackmail."

The president asked the businessmen to contact their congressmen to urge their support for MX, and spoke at some

length on strategic matters.

"I do want arms control. I can't believe that this world can go on beyond our generation and on down to succeeding generations with this kind of weapon on both sides poised at each other without someday some fool or some maniac or some accident triggering the kind of war that is the end of the line for all of us."

Before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee yesterday former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called for no MX procurement funds in the 1984 budget.

Vance, who served under Carter and McNamara, who served under President Kennedy, also called for limiting the 1984 defense budget increase to 5 percent by eliminating "expensive duplication of programs" of which MX is one.

"We're not suggesting we cut \$136 billion for social programs or to let taxes be cut," said McNamara. He said he is recommending the reduction because, "I don't think we need it."

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600430045-9